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In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve has initiated various macro-
prudential policies to stabilize asset prices and stimulate the real economy. These policies achieved
the targets during the recession in 2011, but failed in this task during the recovery in 2014. This pa-
per rationalizes these observations on the effectiveness of macro-prudential policies in a three-period
general-equilibrium model with incomplete markets, heterogeneous agents and endogenous leverage.
The crucial insight is the interaction between belief heterogeneity and financial innovation at equilib-
rium. Financial innovation, as an additional macro-prudential tool, alongside collateral requirements
on borrowing, takes the form of collateral protection insurance (CPI) contracts. The results show
that macro-prudential policies which stabilize asset prices, may not improve social welfare. Specifi-
cally, policies that regulate higher collateral requirements stabilize asset prices, smooth the leverage
cycle, but reduce social welfare, when belief heterogeneity is small. In contrast, the introduction of
CPI contracts increases the dispersion of asset prices across date events, exacerbating the leverage
cycle, but improves social welfare, when belief heterogeneity is large.
1 Introduction
After the 2008 financial crisis, economies have suffered from depressed asset prices and low aggregate
consumption. Also, it has been observed that high leverage volatility was followed by large fluctuations of
asset prices. Historically, there were leverage cycles: higher leverage was followed by higher asset prices,
and lower leverage was followed by lower asset prices. A vast literature (Korinek & Simsek, 2016; Rubio &
Carrasco-Gallego, 2014) proposed macro-prudential tools like loan-to-value caps and leverage restriction
targeting asset price stability and welfare improvement. These instruments have been implemented by
U.S supervisors. During the recession in 2011, the policy targets were achieved. However, when the
US economy recovered in 2014, the application of macro-prudential instruments was followed by more
volatile asset prices and fewer consumption expenditures, which implies lower social welfare.
This paper explains the effects of macro-prudential policies on asset prices and social welfare in a
three-period general-equilibrium model with incomplete markets, heterogeneous agents and collateral.
The crucial insight is the interaction between belief heterogeneity and financial innovation at equilibrium.
I show that macro-prudential policies which stabilize asset prices may not induce welfare improvement.
∗I am grateful to my adviser, Nikolaos Kokonas, for invaluable guidance and numerous suggestions that significantly
improved this paper. I would also like to thank Herakles Polemarchakis and Asgerdur Petursdottir for helpful comments.
All remaining errors are mine.
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Higher collateral requirements which smooth the leverage cycle reduce social welfare when belief hetero-
geneity is small. Moreover, this paper introduces financial innovation as an additional macro-prudential
policy, alongside higher collateral requirements on borrowing. The financial innovation in the form of
collateral protection insurance (CPI) contracts, assists financial institutions to mitigate the catastrophic
losses stemming from severe financial crises. CPI is known as one type of vehicle insurance. If households
borrow for buying a car, they are required to buy CPI. Insurance companies as CPI sellers will repay
lenders once borrowers default. I show that the introduction of CPI contracts exacerbates the leverage
cycle but improves social welfare when belief heterogeneity is large.
By incorporating collateral and agent heterogeneity, the model interprets the four facts I explain
below. I use the standard derivation of the Production Price Index (PPI) in the industry of industrial
machinery manufacturing to measure the volatility of asset prices. For example, the volatility of PPI
in 2011.I is the standard derivation of monthly PPI from 2010-03-01 to 2011-03-01. The industrial
machinery is a subsector of the industry that produces and maintains machines for consumers and other
firms. As it requires initial investment and generates a long-term return, it fits the asset described in
the model. Moreover, this paper uses the real personal consumption expenditures on non-durable goods
to index social welfare.
Stylized fact 1: Fluctuations of asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) spread during the global
financial crisis.
Figure 1 displays trades of asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), which facilitates the flow of funds
between entrepreneurs and investors. From 2007-2009, there was high volatility of ABCP spread from
2007-2009. It went up from the first season of 2007. From this time point, ABCP sellers should offer
higher returns.
Stylized fact 2: After Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) stress tests were applied,
the volatility of asset prices decreased, and real personal consumption expenditures increased.
In the third quarter of 2011, CCAR stress tests were adopted. CCAR is an annual exercise by the
Federal Reserve to assess whether the largest bank holding companies operating in the US have sufficient
capital to continue operations throughout the financial stress.
The volatility of the Producer Price Index (PPI) in the industry of industrial machinery manufacturing
dropped greatly in the third quarter of 2011. Also, the real personal consumption expenditures on non-
durable goods increased between the third quarter of 2011 and the second quarter of 2012.
Stylized fact 3: After Inter-agency Guidance on Leverage Lending (IGLL) took effect, the volatility
of asset prices increased, and real personal consumption expenditures decreased.
In the first quarter in 2013, the Inter-agency Guidance on Leverage Lending (IGLL) was published
and in the last quarter of 2014 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) notice was issued, to address strong
growth in leveraged lending after the 2008 financial crisis. The IGLL and FAQs focus on the size and risk
profile of the leveraged activities of an institution, relative to its assets, capital, liquidity and earnings.
Calem, Correa, and Lee (2020) found that the IGLL had a significant effect on loan trades only after
the FAQs were published. Figure 2 shows that in the last quarter of 2014, the volatility of PPI increased
and the real personal consumption expenditures on non-durable goods decreased.
Stylized fact 4: After the G-SIB capital surcharges was applied, the volatility of asset prices increased,
and real personal consumption expenditures increased.
In the second quarter of 2014, each global systemically important bank holding company (G-SIB)
will have to finance its assets with additional capital to increase its resiliency in light of the greater
threat they pose to the financial stability in the US. One goal of G-SIB capital surcharges is to make
government bailouts of G-SIBs less likely by having G-SIBs self-insure themselves against severe financial
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crises. This policy took effective in the first quarter of 2016. Figure 2 shows that in the first quarter of
2016, the volatility of PPI increased while real personal consumption expenditures on non-durable goods
increased.
Fact 1 suggests that heterogeneous beliefs on collateral value between lenders and borrowers could be
reflected by the ABCP trades.1 Figure 1 illustrates that the significant increase of ABCP spread in 2007
is before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers which happened in the fourth season of 2008. This could
be attributed to the lenders’ perceived reduction of the collateral value. Thus, a high ABCP spread
could imply large belief heterogeneity.
Facts 2 and 3 suggest that belief heterogeneity affects the effectiveness of macro-prudential policies.
Figure 2 shows that the belief heterogeneity was large when CCAR stress tests were issued. This moment
is after US stock markets crashed in the second quarter of 20112. By contrast, the belief heterogeneity
was small when IGLL took effect. Since the second quarter of 2014, the US economy began to recover and
GDP rebounded strongly. This implies that macro-prudential policies may increase social welfare and
reduce the volatilities of asset prices during the recession. However, they may reduce social welfare and
increase the volatilities of asset prices during the recovery. Lastly, Fact 4 suggests that the requirement
on enhancing resiliency of financial institutions may increase the volatilities of asset prices, but still
improve social welfare.
This paper develops a framework that rationalizes these patterns in the stylized facts driven by the
macro-prudential policies. In particular, CPI is introduced as a new type of collateral to interpret the
patterns in Fact 4. Since CPI as an additional collateral assists financial institution to self-insure against
severe crises, CPI is a relevant financial instrument to lower the lenders’ loss of G-SIB default. Although
a myriad of other factors could have contributed to the aforementioned facts during this time period,
this paper ignores them.
As previously noted, collateral and belief heterogeneity play important roles in the model. I present
a three-period, general-equilibrium model along the lines of Geanakoplos (2010a) model of the leverage
cycle. The core element of the analysis is the repayment enforce-ability problem: Suppose that if
borrowers default, they cannot be forced to repay except by seizing collateral. Agents should post
collateral in order to issue promises. The collateral prices determine both the funding to borrowers and
the repayment to lenders. The economy has three periods with uncertainty about the state of nature.
The capital investment pays out in the last period, and in the middle period information arrives about
the likelihood of the final payoffs. If there is good news in the middle period, uncertainty about the
capital return decreases, otherwise, the uncertainty increases. There are three types of agents that hold
heterogeneous beliefs about the realization of the recession: optimists, moderates and pessimists. Agents
trade loans to borrow and lend. Optimists have access to a technology that allows them to invest in
capital in the initial period, while moderates and pessimists are constrained by technology barriers and
buy capital goods from optimists in the middle period.
I analyze two economies. The first one is defined as Leverage-economy or L-economy. Leverage
describes that capital goods as collateral support borrowers to issue loans. Across states, equilibrium
leverage is not constant. Borrowing capacities fluctuate with endogenous leverage. The variations of
leverage drive the business cycle. In the second, CPI is introduced into the previous leverage economy.
I call this CPI-economy. CPI contracts as an additional type of collateral backing up loans affect
1The collateral of ABCP includes assets under repos, trade receivables, structured finance securities, commercial loans,
residential mortgages. Although this paper focus on the collateral held by agents with productive technology, ABCP is a
good example of short-term collateralized lending market.
2In August 2011, there was a sharp drop in stock prices across the US. Because of the slow economic growth of the US,
the US sovereign debt was downgraded.
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Figure 1: Collateralized lending in US
Notes: Figure 1 shows the trades of asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). The ABCP spread measures the
difference between the return of the ABCP and the return of a treasury bill with similar maturity.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank-Business Finance Data.
Figure 2: Application of macro-prudential policies in US
Notes: The purple line shows the trades of asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). The ABCP spread measures
the difference between the return of the ABCP and the return of a treasury bill with similar maturity. The red
line shows the volatility of Producer Price Index (PPI) in the industry of Industrial Machinery Manufacturing
from 2011 to 2015. The volatility is measured by the standard derivation of the PPI in one year. For example,
the volatility of PPI in 2011.I is the standard derivation of monthly PPI from 2010-03-01 to 2011-03-01. The
blue line shows how much agents spent on non-durable goods from 2011 to 2015, based on the price level in 2012.
The green dashed line marks the time point when CCAR stress tests took effect. The yellow dashed line marks the
time point when IGLL took effect. The pink dashed line marks the time point when higher collateral requirement
on G-SIB took effect.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank-Business Finance Data.
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endogenous leverage and thus influence the leverage cycle. CPI trades are only between optimists and
moderates. Because pessimists always “ask” higher prices for selling CPI relative to moderates, optimists
will always go for cheaper CPI contracts in equilibrium.
I present a series of numerical simulations to rationalize the patterns in the stylized facts. The
ABCP spread is modeled as the promised return over the loan price. The model simulations show
that the loan premium is an increasing function of belief heterogeneity. In other words, lenders expect
higher compensation from borrowers when they believe that default is very likely. Additionally, macro-
prudential policies, CCAR stress tests and IGLL are linked with leverage. Acharya, Engle, and Pierret
(2014) used the leverage ratio to measure the effect of stress tests and Kim, Plosser, and Santos (2018)
showed that IGLL was effective at reducing the banks’ leveraged lending activity. Since leverage is a
decrease function of collateral requirements, this paper models CCAR stree tests and IGLL by increasing
collateral requirements on borrowing. The simulation results show that when belief heterogeneity is large,
increasing collateral requirements on borrowing reduces the volatility of asset prices and improves social
welfare. However, when belief heterogeneity is small, this macro-prudential instrument reduces the
volatility of asset prices but reduces social welfare. Moreover, the G-SIB capital surcharges induce a
high cost on banks to comply with the requirement. The need for cost reduction may lead to financial
innovation (Vousinas, 2015). As additional capital is required to absorb the potential losses of risky assets,
this macro-prudential tool is modeled as requiring borrowers to hold CPI contracts. The simulation of the
CPI-economy illustrates that if financial institutions are required to use CPI to self-insure, the volatility
of asset prices and social welfare increases.
The crucial insight is that belief heterogeneity influences the cost of borrowing and the repayments
to lenders. If agents share similar beliefs on collateral value, the loan premium is low and asset prices fall
by little in the recession. This translates to low borrowing cost and higher repayment rates to lenders
even if borrowers default. Even though increasing collateral requirements on borrowing reduces the
losses buyers face in recessions, it increases the cost of borrowing and thus reduces productive savings.
Thus, since the macro-prudential policy increase the borrowing cost by large, the beneficial impact of
the macro-prudential policy on lenders cannot offset the harm on borrowers. The social welfare declines.
On the other hand, if there is an extreme belief disagreement between borrowers and lenders, lenders
suffer from a severe loss induced by a large decline in asset prices. Since the macro-prudential policy
increases the repayments to lenders by large, the benefit compensates for the expense induced by a higher
borrowing cost. The social welfare increases. Moreover, requiring financial institutions to self-insure also
increases the repayment to lenders. As the CPI contract is cheaper collateral compared with assets, the
financial innovation reduces the borrowing cost of financial institutions. As a result, the social welfare
increases.
I show that the macro-prudential perturbations have three types of effects on social welfare. First,
heterogeneity effects arise because there are differences in the marginal rates of substitution across states
of the world among agents. Second, collateral effects arise because collateral regulation has direct effects
on agents’ borrowing constraints. Third, pecuniary externalities arise because collateral regulations
change asset prices. Therefore, the effectiveness of macro-prudential policies is determined by the sign and
magnitude of the aforementioned effects. I identify sufficient conditions that characterize unambiguously
the impact of the macro-prudential policies on social welfare. These conditions take the form of the
difference in beliefs of agents, the net trading positions of loans and assets, the asset prices in the recession,
the cost of satisfying collateral constraints and the sensitivity of asset prices to the perturbations.
The simulation results also illustrate that increasing collateral requirements on borrowing lowers wel-
fare through tighter collateral constraints; on the other hand, tightening collateral regulations increases
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welfare through effects arising from heterogeneous beliefs and stabilized asset prices. By contrast, in-
troducing CPI contracts lowers social welfare due to unstable asset prices but improves social welfare
considering heterogeneous beliefs. Also, a tighter collateral requirement on CPI contracts has no effect on
social welfare. The result also shows that heterogeneity effects and collateral effects are always dominant,
while pecuniary externalities are negligible. It means that policy authorities should focus on motivating
productive investment rather than stabilizing asset prices if lenders and borrowers share similar beliefs on
investment projects. Additionally, CPI contracts as an additional type of collateral facilitate borrowers
to enhance their borrowing capacity without lowering their resiliency. Therefore, this macro-prudential
tool induces welfare improvement though it destabilizes asset prices.
1.1 Related literature
This paper is closely related to the work of Geanakoplos (1997) who pioneered the general equilibrium
analysis of collateralized lending. Geanakoplos (2003) introduced the idea of equilibrium leverage. He
also identified an increase in belief heterogeneity as a cause of decreased leverage and hence of the
leverage cycle. The leverage cycle, defined by Geanakoplos (2010a), means that there are times when
leverage is high, agents can invest with little money as the down-payment, and times when leverage is
low, agents should have enough money in hand to invest. The baseline setting captures no default with
riskless loan contracts. Geanakoplos (2010b) suggested the leverage should be monitored and limited in
the ebullient times to avoid a plunge of capital prices induced by an out-sized leverage cycle. In addition,
Araujo, Kubler, and Schommer (2012) and Simsek (2013) follow the model of Geanakoplos (1997). In
their model, however, the loans traded in the equilibrium are risky, as they focused on the negative effect
of default on the real economy. Araujo et al. (2012) show how regulations on leverage, that is, restricting
the sets of tradable assets through intervention on collateral requirements, affect social welfare. These
arguments motivate this research to investigate how collateral regulations influence the leverage cycle if
borrowers’ default can only be eliminated by tighter collateral requirements.
Another strand of the theoretical literature concerns the effect of borrowing constraints on asset prices,
for example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), ?, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Fostel and Geanakoplos
(2012), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014). Borrowing decisions made in the good times of the business
cycle destabilize collateral prices, especially when borrowers default in the recession. Stabilizing asset
prices across the business cycle calls for macro-prudential policies that limit excessive credit growth and
leverage (Rubio & Carrasco-Gallego, 2014). These prevention policies take the form of tax on debt,
relying on the argument that over-borrowing during normal, non-crisis times affect collateral prices in
the downturn (Bianchi & Mendoza, 2018). However, Benigno, Chen, Otrok, Rebucci, and Young (2013)
pointed out that adopting the macro-prudential policies may be costly in welfare terms. If a small tax
on debt eliminates the probability of a crisis, the decrease of average consumption reduces social welfare.
This paper shows how the macro-prudential perturbations on borrowing with collateral influence asset
prices and social welfare.
There is a strand of empirical work which shows that agents actually form different beliefs and how
heterogeneous beliefs influence asset prices. Frankel and Froot (1985) did a survey which explains the
observed volatility of foreign exchange rates by belief heterogeneity. Moreover, Kandel and Pearson
(1995) conduct an empirical research of heterogeneous beliefs of investors. They showed that the stock
returns are influenced by different interpretations of public information by investors. This paper is
also related to the literature concerning the plausibility of belief heterogeneity in collateralized lending.
Simsek (2013) stated that the borrowing constraint stems from the belief heterogeneity between borrowers
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and lenders. Optimists borrow from pessimists to invest in projects. Pessimists might be reluctant to
lend because they do not value optimists’ collateral (the project) as much as optimists do (Simsek, 2013).
The level of belief heterogeneity influences the tightness of a constraint on optimists’ ability to borrow.
Geanakoplos and Zame (2014) also showed that the increase in belief heterogeneity decreases leverage
and collateral prices, and thus increases borrowers’ funding cost.
In addition, belief heterogeneity is plausible in analyzing effectiveness of policies regarding of social
welfare. The seminal contributions of Kurz, Jin, and Motolese (2005), Branch and McGough (2009) and
De Grauwe (2011) argued that the belief heterogeneity affects the efficacy of monetary policy. Wei (2020)
proposes that the level of belief heterogeneity influences the effectiveness of setting loan-to-value caps.
Brunnermeier (2014) proposed a belief-neutral welfare criterion that requires policymakers to be sure of
the presence of belief disagreements among agents instead of taking a stand on whose belief is correct.
These arguments motivate this research on how belief heterogeneity influences the effects of collateral
regulations on social welfare.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature about the effects of financial innovation on the business
cycle. Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2006) proposed that financial innovation such as developments in
lending practices and loan markets enhances the ability of firms and households to borrow. In addition,
Morrison (2005) stated that financial innovation like credit derivatives enables entrepreneurs to obtain
cheap bond market finance, but social welfare decreases. The reason might be an under-pricing of the
risk in a new financial environment, resulting in a surge in credit and asset prices (Boz & Mendoza, 2014).
Morrison (2005) suggested this negative effect can be countered by the introduction of reporting require-
ments for credit derivatives. On the other hand, if financial innovation complements policy restrictions
on borrowing constraints, economic activities are motivated. Thus, it motivates my research on how
introducing financial innovation together with prudential regulations affects the volatility of asset prices
and social welfare. Moreover, Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) showed that financial innovation modeled
as a structural change could generate another cycle characterized by higher endogenous leverage. This
paper characterizes the leverage cycle with CPI contracts introduced.
Outline The remained is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model environment. Section 3
presents agents’ behavior in the equilibrium. The numerical examples show that under certain conditions,
the above stylized facts emerge naturally in the equilibrium. Section 4 examines the mechanism and
characterizes the conditions for welfare-improving. Section 5 presents robustness results. Section 6
concludes. Appendices A-C present supplemental material.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic Environment
The economy lasts for three periods, t = 0, 1, 2. The uncertainty is characterized by a tree of states s ∈ S
and S = {0,H, L,HL,HH,LL,LH}. H stands for the boom state, and L stands for the bust state.
This paper denotes the time of s by t(s), so t(0) = 0, t(s1) = 1, and t(s2) = 2. s1 ∈ S1, S1 = {H,L},
and s2 ∈ S2, S2 = {HH,HL,LH,LL}. Agents i’s endowment of the consumption good is represented
by eis in each state s ∈ S. The endowments ei0 enable agents to lend or borrow. At date 0, there is one
consumption good. The shock to the economy is uncertain. Agents transfer their wealth intertemporally
by investing either financial contracts (q) or capital (k). At date 0, capital investment transfers α units
of consumption goods into one unit of capital goods. At date 1, the uncertainty is realized by either
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the endowments or capital price, ps. At date 2, the uncertainty is realized by the dividends of capital
investment. Also, the capital dividends has the characteristic that good news reduces the uncertainty
while bad news increases uncertainty. I assume, as shown in Figure 5, that after good news at s = H,
the capital return equals rkHH = rkHL. However, after bad news at state s = L, I assume that rkLH > rkLL.
This assumption is made for simplicity as this paper focuses on the recession which is induced by the
combination of bad news.
Each agent i is characterized by a utility ui, a discount factor β and different subjective probabilities
πis, s ∈ S \ 0. I assume that agents are risk-averse. Thus, in each state s ∈ S, the utility function is











Suppose agents have identical wealth, utilities and discount rates, but differ in their beliefs. This paper
assumes that the beliefs are common knowledge among agents. Before discussing welfare properties in the
equilibrium, it is useful to sort out different sources of belief agreements. Suppose the correct possibility
πs of the future states is unobservable. Three types of agents, optimists, moderates and pessimists are
denoted by i = 1, i = 2 and i = 3 respectively. They observe some information about πs and know each
others’ beliefs at date 0. This means three types of agents agree to disagree. The subjective possibilities
πis denotes the probability of reaching state s from its predecessor s−, s− ∈ {0,H, L}. This paper
denotes Π to be the given distribution of the heterogeneous beliefs on the downturn, which is discrete
and positive. Let σ denote standard derivation corresponding to the beliefs of three types of agents. A
larger σ means agents have more distinctive belief on the bust state from each other. I suppose beliefs
are captured by persistent individual heterogeneity, so each agent’s belief is independent and identically
distributed.
2.2 Financial contracts
The core part of this research includes financial contracts and collateral. The definition of financial
contracts is an agreement including a promise and the collateral backing it and the definition of financial
innovation is new types of promises backed by collateral, or the use of new types of collateral. There is no
doubt that the payment of collateral depends on the future state of nature. As the collateral dividends
are independent from the promise size and other decisions of contract sellers, the consideration of hidden
effort is eliminated. Also, I assume that the collateral used to secure some contracts cannot back other
Figure 3: Capital return
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contracts.
The price of financial contract (q ∈ Q) is mqs and the amount of contracts traded is θisq. A positive
θisq indicates that agents i buy contracts q or saving θisqmqs, while a negative θisq indicates that agents i
sell contracts q or raise | θisq | mqs for financing their investment.
A one-period loan contract (q = b ∈ Qb) promises 1 unit of consumption goods, backed by a amount
of collateral xbs which has to satisfy the collateral requirement C
b
s ≥ 0. Thus, loan contracts (Qb)
are characterized by many alternative collateral requirements with the same promise. According to
assumptions in the previous subsection, agents 1 only borrow in the state 0 and L. I assume that the
collateral should be held by agents who take the short position of financial contracts. Since the return
function of collateral required in the contracts is the same for each agent F is(C
b) = F i
′
s (C
b),∀s ∈ S \ 0,
there is no adverse selection problem. Since the contract sellers lose the return of their collateral if they
do not honor their promise, the delivery of loan contracts (rbs) at date 1 is
min{1,F is(C
b)}.
The loan contract is priced at mbs and the traded amount is θisb. Each loan contract b has a distinct
collateral requirement Cbs = (φs), s ∈ {0, L}, where φs, s ∈ {0, L} is the collateral requirement on
capital. Default at date 1 depends on capital prices ps. If the capital price in the equilibrium satisfy the
assumption, p̄L < 1/φ̄0, p̄H ≥ 1/φ̄0, loan contract sellers only default in the state L.
The CPI contracts (q = j ∈ Qj) is a derivative contract and its payoff depend on the actual payoff of
loan contracts. As a new type of collateral, it provides additional collateral dividends for loan contracts.
In the economy with CPI contracts, Cb0 = (φ0, h0), where h0 is the collateral requirement on CPI





(0, 1 − φ0p̄L). The CPI contract is priced at mj0, and the traded amount is θi0j . The cost of selling one
unit of CPI is ε. Thus, the cost function is T (θi0j) = 1{θi0j<0}εθ
i
0j .3 Only capital investors can buy CPI
contracts.
Although I have supposed that the set of loan contracts that may be issued and the collateral re-
quirement associated with each of them is given; the only contract actively traded has a endogenously
determined collateral requirement. Suppose there are interventions requiring more collateral than the
endogenous level. The actively traded loan contract has the collateral requirement exogenously deter-
mined by the interventions. I assume parameters are consistent with default in the bust state. The
loans traded in the equilibrium are risky, so this model is particularly suitable to study economic issues
associated with default of collateralized loans.
In the economy where only capital can be used as collateral to issue promise, xb = (k). The interven-
tion to reduce lenders’ loss is increasing φ. In the L-economy, only capital can be used as collateral to issue
promise, xb = (k). If the collateral requirement of the loan contracts issued at date 0 is Cb = φ0 = 1/p̄L,
F iL(C
b) = φ0p̄L = 1. Increasing collateral requirements will not increase rbL, so the collateral regulation
manipulates the collateral requirement in the interval (0, 1/p̄L]. In the economy where the collateral of
loan contracts includes both capital and CPI contracts, xb = (k, θj). The intervention is increasing h0.
When h0 = 1, F iL(C
b) = φ0p̄L + h0r
j
L = 1. Hence, the interval of manipulating h0 is [0, 1].
3Collateral hedging is costly because the sellers of CPI need to evaluate the riskiness of capital investment by small
firms which do not expose much financial information. Since this paper focuses on the pecuniary externalities induced by
changes in asset prices, the financial innovation cost is trivial. Thus, I assume ε = 0 in the following analysis.
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2.3 Budget set
Given capital price (p) and financial contract prices ((mq)q∈Q), agents i decides commodities cs , for
each s ∈ S, investment k and contracts trades θsq. It is assumed that the expectation of price level is
equal to the current price level. This means that the default of loan contracts only depends on the worth
difference between promise and collateral, and is independent of the price level. At time 0, maximize
utility (1) subject to the budget set defined by
Bi(p,mq) ={(c, k, θq) :
















s ,∀s ∈ S1





s ,∀s ∈ S2∑
b∈Qb
max(0,−θsb)Cbs ≤ xbs,∀s ∈ {0, L}.
The first inequality requires that money spent on consumption goods beyond the revenue from endow-
ments and production in state 0 be financed out of the sale of contracts. The financial innovation cost
function is T (θi0j) = 1{θi0j<0}εθ
i
0j , where1{θij<0} is the indicator function defined on trading CPI con-
tracts takes on the value 1 when θij < 0 and 0 otherwise. The second inequality requires money spent
on the consumption goods and capital goods beyond the revenue from endowments in any state s ∈ S1
be financed out of the sale of contracts and net revenue from return from contracts bought or sold in
state 0. The third inequality requires money spent on the consumption goods beyond the revenue from
endowments and production in any state s ∈ S2 be financed out of net revenue from return from con-
tracts bought or sold in date 1. The last constraint requires that agents actually hold as least as much
of collateral as financial contracts require them to hold.
2.4 Collateral equilibrium
A collateral equilibrium is a collection of prices, consumption, capital investment and contract trades






i + T (θ̄j
i









i − eis)− rks ¯ks−
i





= 0,∀q ∈ Q (5)
(c̄i, k̄, θ̄q
i
) ∈ Bi(m̄q),∀i (6)
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(c̄, k̄, θ̄q) ∈ Bi(p̄, m̄q) ⇒ U i(c̄) ≤ U i(c̄i),∀i (7)
The first four mean that in the equilibrium markets for consumption goods, capital goods and contracts
in each state clear. The equations (6) and (7) describe that agents optimize their utility subject to their
budget sets. As shown in Geanakoplos and Zame (2014), the collateral equilibrium always exists under
these assumptions.
I will show how agents design their portfolio in the equilibrium of the L-economy and CPI-economy
in the Section 3.1.
2.5 Leverage
The key concept of this paper is leverage. The definition of leverage is the inverse of the haircut. The
haircut is the complement of the LTV ratio and the definition of the LTV is a ratio of the total borrowing
to the down-payment of capital investment (Geanakoplos & Zame, 2014). At date 0, with CPI contracts,
optimists invest α units of consumption good to achieve 1 unit of capital investment and buy θ10j units
of CPI contracts. These serve as collateral for issuing | θ10b | units of loan contracts. Hence, Haircut0 is























0j −mb0 | θ10b |
.
In the state L, optimists spend pLk1L to buy capital goods from moderates and pessimists. The
capital goods serve as collateral for borrowing mbL | θ1Lb |. Hence, LTVL is
HaircutL = 1− LTVL =
pLk
1
L −mbL | θ1Lb |
pLk1L
.





pLk1L −mbL | θ1Lb |
.
The leverage is endogenous. The Leverage0 depends on capital investment and loan price and it
affects the capital prices at date 1.
2.6 Discussion
This section shows the interpretation of the model and comments the role of some assumptions.
Optimists could be interpreted as firms. At date 0, they invest in capital and borrow as much as he
could. They believe that they will get a great return and he is planning to pay back as he promised.
However, lenders are not sure they could get paid. Moderates and pessimists as lenders in this setting,
instead of checking financial information of a firm, much simpler require collateral. At date 0, because of
technology barriers, they do not invest in capital and lend to agents 1. Agents 2 and 3 can be interpreted
in different ways. They could be interpreted as households taking long position on corporate bonds.
They could also be interpreted as financial intermediaries who can evaluate the production projects and
offer funds to firms.
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There are some assumptions in order to streamline the analysis. I assume that only agents 1 can
invest in capital goods at date 0. Thus, capital goods are only traded at date 1. This describes a firm
which produces technology or facilities at the initial date and sells them at date 1. Each agent can use
the technology to produce consumption goods. Their beliefs about the state in date 2 influences capital
prices which in turn determines the payoffs of loans issued at date 0.
Agents 1 could also be interpreted as commercial Banks. At date 0, they invests in risky assets to
make profit. Moderates and pessimists as lenders are depositors. Even though they do not require banks
hold collateral for accepting deposits directly, Basel III regulates banks to hold capital to decrease the
likelihood that banks go insolvent.
3 The leverage cycle
This section firstly shows how agents behave in the L-economy and CPI-economy and then presents
numerical examples of equilibrium. The results show how leverage influences capital prices positively.
They raise and fall together, which is described as the leverage cycle.
3.1 Agents’ behavior
3.1.1 L-economy
Table 1: Agents’ behavior in the L-economy
Type s = 0 s = L s = H
Optimists Capital investment and Sell loans Sell capital and Sell loans Sell capital
subject to −φ0θ10b ≤ k0 subject to −φLθ1Lb ≤ k1L
Moderates Buy loans Buy capital and Buy/Sell loans Buy capital
Pessimists Buy loans Buy capital and Buy loans Buy capital
In the L-economy, there is no CPI contracts. At date 0, agents 1 borrow money by issuing loan contracts
and invest in capital which serves as collateral. Their portfolio is {k0, θ10b} where k0 > 0, θ10b < 0. In the
equilibrium, k0 = −φ0θ10b, so Leverage0 = φ0α/(φ0α−mb0). Increasing φ0 reduces Leverage0. Agents 2
and 3 cannot get access to capital goods and only buy the loan contracts issued by agents 1. Thus, loan
contract buyers whose portfolio is {θi0b}, i = 2, 3, where θi0b > 0, i = 2, 3.
In the state L, agents 1 repay to lenders by delivering the collateral and borrow for holding capital.
Their portfolio choices are {k1L, θ1Lb}, where k1L > 0, θ1Lb < 0. In the equilibrium, k1L = −φLθ1Lb, so
LeverageL = φLpL/(φLpL−mbL). Agents 2 and 3 will receive their loan dividends. They also buy capital
goods. Agents 2 may choose to sell loans and agents 3 buy loans.4 Their portfolio is {kiL, θiLb}, i = 2, 3,
where kiL > 0, i = 2, 3.
In the state H, agents 1 sell part of capital goods to repay the loan contract issued at date 0. Since
there is no uncertainty in capital dividends, agents 1 will not borrow.5 Their portfolio is {k1H},where
k1H > 0. Agents 2 and 3 buy capital goods, whose portfolio is {kiH}, i = 2, 3, where kiH > 0, i = 2, 3.
Table 1 shows agents’ behavior in the L-economy.
4Even if agents 2 sell loans in the equilibrium, they are not constrained, −φLθ20b < k
2
L.
5There is no borrowing because loans and capital goods are perfect substitutes.
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3.1.2 CPI-economy
A Collateral Protection Insurance (CPI) contract which provides insurance on collateral value is
issued by lenders. It pays 0 in the boom state and pays (1−φ0p̄L) in the bust state. CPI contracts serve
as part of collateral for backing loan contracts. Thus, the delivery in the bust state is (φ0p̄L + h0rjL).
Table 2: Agents’ behavior in the CPI-economy
Type s = 0 s = L s = H
Capital investment, Buy CPI and Sell loans Sell capital and Sell loans
Optimists subject to −φ0θ10b ≤ k0 subject to −φLθ1Lb ≤ k1L Sell capital
and −h0θ10j ≤ θ10j
Moderates Buy loans and Sell CPI Buy capital and Buy/Sell loans Buy capital
Pessimists Buy loans Buy capital and Buy loans Buy capital
Table 2 shows agents’ behavior in the CPI-economy. Agents 1 are required to take long position of
capital and CPI contracts for borrowing. At date 0, their portfolio is {k0, θ10j , θ10b} where k0 > 0, θ10j >





0 − mb0). Increasing h0 reduces Leverage0. Agents 2 and 3 lend to agents 1 by purchasing loan
contracts. Since agents 3 require more compensation for bearing higher default risk based on their
expectation than agents 2 do, agents 1 will only buy CPI contracts from agents 2 who always sell CPI
contracts at a lower price than agents 3. Thus, agents 2 choose to take more risk by selling CPI contracts
at date 0 and innovate. Their portfolio is {θ20j , θ20b}, where θ20j < 0, θ20b > 0. Moreover, CPI purchasing
cannot be separate from other collateral investment. Agents 3 cannot buy CPI contracts because they do
not invest in capital. Thus, agents 3 are initially constrained from trading in the CPI contracts. Their
portfolio is {θ30b}, where θ30b > 0. In addition, CPI contracts are introduced to reduce the loss of loan
buyers. If there are only two types of agents, lenders are the sellers of CPI and the buyers of loans. The
increase of rbL they receive is paid back to borrowers in the form of CPI payoff. Thus, the setting with
three types of agents is necessary, because agents 3 who do not sell CPI receive more in the bust state.
Furthermore, at date 1, introducing CPI contracts is redundant, because the market is complete with
two assets, namely capital goods and loan contracts. Thus, agents behave as they do in the L-economy.
In date 1, there is no collateral requirement on CPI contracts. Thus, the portfolio choices of each
type of agents in the CPI economy is the same as those in the L-economy.
3.2 Numerical examples
In this section, I present three simulations based on the fundamental values in the Table 3. Since this
paper focuses on how pecuniary externalities influence the effectiveness of macro-prudential policies, I
assume the financial innovation cost is zero for simplicity. Since good news in the middle period reduces
uncertainty about capital return, I assume that the uncertainty is 0 after state H, rkHL = rkHH . Since
I focus on the downturn of the leverage cycle, the series of fundamental values satisfy that the capital
price in the state L is less than the promise of loan contracts. Also, I assume eiL < eiH to increase the
difference between boom and bust in the middle period, so that the effects of macro-prudential policies
on allocations are significant. Moreover, since increasing φL does not induce real changes, I assume
φLr
k
LL = 1 for simplicity. I also suppose a capital adjustment cost, α > 1, to capture the investment in
the industry of Industrial Machinery Manufacturing. Lastly, as I do not focus on discount rates and the
weight of different groups in the economy, I suppose β = 1 and every type of agents has identical weight,
wi = 1/3.
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Table 3: Fundamental values
Value Value Value Value
ei0 2 rkHL 3.8 α 1.5 wi 0.33
eiH 2.5 rkHH 3.8 β 1 π2L 0.5
eiL 1.02 rkLH 3.8 φL 1.43 ε 0
eis2 1.02 r
k
LL 0.7 ρ 1
The first simulation shows how the asset prices and leverage engage in a positive feedback and compare
the leverage cycles with different belief disagreement. The second simulation shows how leverage and
capital price in the state L are affected by belief disagreement. I do the third simulation to compare
the effects of the macro-prudential policies on the leverage cycle in the environment with varying belief
disagreement (σ). The policy target is rbL = 1. Specifically, the policy tools are (i) increasing the
collateral requirement on capital by ∆φ0; (ii)introducing CPI contracts and increasing the collateral
requirement on CPI contracts by ∆h0.
In this section, I specialize the model to the case of an isoelastic utility function with intertemporal





1−ρ if ρ 6= 1
log(cis) if ρ = 1
Additionally, to simplify the belief distribution, I suppose that skewness is zero and that π2s is identical
in each distribution. For example, beliefs are given by π1L = π2L−σ, π2L and π3L = π2L+σ. The each type
of agents’ belief is ranked as π1L < π2L < π3L. Notice that this study does not change fundamentals such
as utility functions, endowments, capital returns and asset payoffs in the three simulations.
3.2.1 An example
Table 4: Equilibrium Leverage Cycle when σ = 0.15
States s = 0 s = H s = L
mbs 0.9335 - 0.6226
Leverages 2.6478 - 1.8000
ps 1.5 3.4275 0.9807
ks 1.3829 0.7202 0.5381
Table 5: Equilibrium Leverage Cycle when σ = 0.25
States s = 0 s = H s = L
mbs 0.9123 - 0.6512
Leverages 2.5524 - 1.9060
ps 1.5 3.3161 0.9589
ks 1.4565 0.7514 0.6809
Simulation 1 provides an example of the leverage cycle with an additional parameter values, the
collateral requirement of loan contracts issued at date 0, φ0 = 1. The reason why I choose φ0 = 1 is that
it is higher than the collateral requirement which does not constrain optimists. 6Also, with φ0 = 1, in
the equilibrium, rbL < 1 calls for increasing collateral requirements.
At date 0, it takes 1.5 units of consumption goods to achieve 1 unit of capital goods. Table 4 and
5 show that at date 1, capital prices are rising and falling with the leverage. There are three reasons
for the crash of capital prices. Firstly, from state 0 to the state L, the uncertainty is increased. For
example, when σ = 0.15, pessimists believe the possibility of state LL is 0.4225 at date 0, but at the
state L, the possibility is 0.65. The pessimists value the capital goods much less. The disagreement
6The not binding collateral requirement is 0.5351, when σ = 0.15. Also, in the Simulation 3, this fixed φ = 1 satisfies
this condition in the economy with varying belief disagreement σ ∈ [0.05, 0.25].
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between optimists and pessimists over the capital value is higher at L than at 0. Optimists believe that
the low capital price is an opportunity, because the expected payoff of capital goods reduces little. They
will borrow with loan contracts which generate higher return. It is shown in the first row in table 4 that
mb0 > m
b
L. Also, k0 is more in the case where belief disagreement is 0.25. It implies that optimists are
willing to take more risk if π1H is larger.
The second reason is deleveraging. Since the value of capital goods is composed into two parts,
namely the discounted future payoff and its pledge-ability. The lower leverage at state L means that the
borrowing which capital goods support is less. Thus, the capital price goes down. The third reason is
the bankruptcy of optimists. They are capital buyers. Their wealth loss weakens their purchasing power,
resulting in lower capital price. Table 4 also shows that when k0 is higher, the loss of optimists is higher.
The pL is lower.
3.2.2 Asset prices and leverage for varying belief heterogeneity
Figure 4: Leverage for varying σ when φ0 = 1 Figure 5: pL for varying σ when φ0 = 1
Since the capital price determines default of loan contracts, simulation 2 examines varying belief
disagreement with the collateral requirement fixed. Figure 6 demonstrates that if the belief heterogeneity
is high, leverage at date 0 is low. It means the borrowing capacity of agents 1 is low, if lenders consider
the collateral value reducing. Figure 7 shows that if belief disagreement is larger, pL is lower. Lenders
lose more in the state L. Also, when belief disagreement is extremely low, capital price in the L state is
higher than 1. This means that though capital returns after state L are uncertain, loan contract sellers
can deliver promised 1 by selling capital. It implies that if agents share similar belief, capital price falls
little in the state L. The macro-prudential policies are not necessary to protect lenders. The results in
the two figures are consistent with the argument of Geanakoplos and Zame (2014).
3.2.3 Interpreting stylized facts in the model
The above numerical exercises illustrate equilibrium outcomes in the absence of macro-prudential inter-
ventions. This section focuses on the effects of two macro-prudential policies: (i) increasing the collateral
requirement on capital by∆φ0; (ii)introducing CPI contracts and increasing the collateral requirement on
CPI contracts by ∆h0. The following simulation results provide a way to jointly interpret the qualitative
patterns of the stylized facts described in the Section 1.
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Figure 6: Loan premium for varying σ
Rationalization of Fact 1 Fact 1 describes the changes in ABCP spread during the global financial
crisis. In this model, the ABCP spread is indexed by the loan premium, which is defined as the promised
return over the loan price 1/mb. Figure 6 shows that when the belief disagreement is larger and the loan
premium is higher. This is qualitatively consistent with Fact 1. Before the global financial crisis, agents
receive bad news and update their beliefs about final payoffs. When loan contract buyers hold much
more pessimistic beliefs than loan contract sellers do, the promises of borrowers are valued much less by
lenders. Borrowers should offer higher returns to sell ABCPs. Thus, the ABCP spread reflect the belief
heterogeneity in the economy.
Table 6: Effects of two macro-prudential policies
when σ = 0.15
Benchmark ∆φ0 ∆h0
rbL 0.9696 1 1
(pL − α)/α -0.3462 -0.3457 -0.3464
(c1L− c10)/c10 -0.4026 -0.4016 -0.4026
(c2L− c20)/c20 -0.1728 -0.1752 -0.1746
(c3L− c30)/c30 -0.1030 -0.1037 -0.1004
V 1.6149 1.6147 1.6154
Table 7: Effects of two macro-prudential policies
when σ = 0.25
Benchmark ∆φ0 ∆h0
rbL 0.9589 1 1
(pL − α)/α -0.3607 -0.3599 -0.3615
(c1L− c10)/c10 -0.4079 -0.4057 -0.4080
(c2L− c20)/c20 -0.1603 -0.1665 -0.1651
(c3L− c30)/c30 -0.0517 -0.0515 -0.0438
V 1.6650 1.6656 1.6666
Rationalization of Facts 2 and 3 Fact 2 describes that CCAR stress tests serving as leverage restric-
tion reduced the volatilities of asset prices and increased the real personal consumption expenditures. In
contrast, Fact 3 describes that IGLL serving as leverage restriction reduced the volatilities of asset prices
but reduce the real personal consumption expenditures. As previously noted, the belief heterogeneity
was different when these two macro-prudential policies became effective. When CCAR stress tests took
effect, belief heterogeneity was large because in 2011, the lack of fundamental changes in banking and
financial markets worried market participants. However, when IGLL took effect in 2014, belief hetero-
geneity was small. As policy announcements about quantitative easing in 2012 stimulated the economy,
most market participants recovered.
In this context, leverage restriction is characterized by increasing φ0. The volatility of asset prices
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is indexed by differences of asset prices between state 0 and state L, (pL − α)/α. The real personal
consumption expenditure level is positively related to social welfare, V . The model simulation results
in Tables 6 and 7 present the effect of macro-prudential policies ∆φ0 > 0 targeting rbL = 1 when belief
disagreement is σ = 0.15 or σ = 0.25 respectively. The second row in tables 6 and 7 show that ∆φ0
reduces the difference of asset prices. The last row in Table 6 shows that when belief disagreement is
0.15, increasing φ0 by 0.0189 reduces social welfare. By contrast, Table 7 presents that when belief
disagreement is 0.2, macro-prudential policies ∆φ0 = 0.0415 increase social welfare. The results imply
that the level of belief disagreement influences the effect of the macro-prudential policies, which is
consistent with the two stylized facts.
Rationalization of Fact 4 Fact 4 describes the higher capital charge on G-SIB increases the volatilities
of asset prices and increases the real personal consumption expenditures. This macro-prudential policies
require financial institutions to adjust their asset components for lower risk exposure and resiliency
improvement. In this model, CPI contracts as an additional type of collateral reduces loss if a financial
institution failed to repay in the crisis. The simulation results in Table 6 and 7 show that increasing
h leads to a larger decline of capital prices. CPI substitutes capital goods as part of collateral, leading
asset prices to decrease. However, the more decrease of capital prices does not induce a drop in social
welfare. This implies that the lower social loss of G-SIB default results in welfare improvement.
3.2.4 Effects of macro-prudential policies on the volatilities of consumption
To figure out the reason for the welfare changes, I look into the difference of consumption between state
0 and state L.7Table 6 shows that increasing φ0 induces the consumption differences of agents 1 to
decrease and the consumption differences of agents 2 and 3 to increase. By contrast, a higher h0 drives
the consumption of agents 1 and 2 up and the consumption differences of agents 3 down. This implies
that the consumption differences of agents 3 (pessimists) is dominant in the effect of macro-prudential
policies on social welfare. The reason is that pessimists have a strong desire to transfer wealth from
states with high consumption to periods with low consumption. As increasing h0 stabilizes consumption
of agents 3 in the cycle, it improves social welfare. This is also proved by the results in the first and third
columns of table 7. Introducing CPI contracts provides an extra insurance instrument against the default
in the recession. It increases social welfare by reducing pessimists’ consumption difference between state
0 and state L. 8Moreover, the comparison between the first and second column in the table 7 illustrates
that social welfare is improved by increasing φ0 and the consumption difference of agents 3 decreases.
This motivates the following discussion about the mechanism of how macro-prudential policies affects
the capital prices and then social welfare.
3.2.5 Effects of macro-prudential policies on the leverage cycle
To increase the loan contract return in the state L, policy makers can increase φ or introduce CPI
contracts and increase h. The results in the Tables 8 and 9 show the effect of the macro-prudential
policies in the economy where σ = 0.15. When φ0 = 1.0189, p̄L = 1/φ0. Lenders receive the promised
delivery at the state L. Comparing Tables 4 and 8, I find the mb0 is higher and the capital investment is
lower with a higher φ0. It reflects that tightening collateral constraints increases the funding cost and
reduce investment in the production activities. However, the results in Tables 4 and 9 show that with a
7Dogra and Gorbachev (2016) argued that consumption volatility increased significantly between 1983 and 2007, indi-
cating substantial welfare losses.
8(Lopez et al., 2016) proposed that the central bank should focus on removing consumption volatility.
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Table 8: The effects of ∆φ0 on Equilibrium Leverage
Cycle when σ = 0.15
States s = 0 s = H s = L
mbs 0.9490 - 0.6230
Leverages 2.6379 - 1.7997
ps 1.5 3.4309 0.9815
ks 1.3807 0.7230 0.5374
Table 9: The effects of ∆h0 on Equilibrium Leverage
Cycle when σ = 0.15
States s = 0 s = H s = L
mbs 0.9457 - 0.6226
Leverages 2.6701 - 1.8004
ps 1.5 3.4264 0.9803
ks 1.3836 0.7205 0.5386
positive collateral requirement on CPI contracts, the mb0 is higher and the capital investment is higher.
Though the loan price is higher in both cases, the capital investment increases in the CPI-economy with
cheaper collateral.
Additionally, in the L-economy, with an increase on φ0, the capital investment decreases and the
capital prices in the states H and L increase. The leverage in both state 0 and state L is lower than the
leverage in the benchmark case. Also, the difference in leverage between 0 and L is 31.77%, which is
lower the difference (32.02%) in the benchmark case. By contrast, increasing h leads capital investment
to increase and drives the capital prices down. The reason for negative effects of increasing h on capital
prices is the higher capital investment at date 0. When there are more capital goods in the economy,
agents will value them less. The leverage increases in the state 0 and L. The difference in leverage is
32.57%, which is higher than that in the benchmark case. This higher leverage and the higher difference
in leverage imply that the introduction of CPI contracts may hurt stability, which may result in a decrease
in social welfare.
Since increasing collateral requirements on capital reduces the leverage, it captures leverage restric-
tions like the CCAR stress tests and the IGLL and FAQs. The results in the previous section also
explains the first questions raised by the stylized fact 1. Furthermore, introduction of CPI also provides
an example of a macro-prudential policy that increase the volatility of leverage and asset prices but
improves social welfare.
Table 10: The effects of ∆φ0 on Equilibrium Lever-
age Cycle when σ = 0.25
States s = 0 s = H s = L
mbs 0.9458 - 0.6519
Leverages 2.5341 - 1.9059
ps 1.5 3.3215 0.9601
ks 1.4528 0.7585 0.6797
Table 11: The effects of ∆h0 on Equilibrium Lever-
age Cycle when σ = 0.25
States s = 0 s = H s = L
mbs 0.9385 - 0.6512
Leverages 2.5994 - 1.9081
ps 1.5 3.3126 0.9577
ks 1.4588 0.7524 0.6829
Tables 10 and 11 shows how the macro-prudential policies influences the leverage cycle in the economy
where the belief disagreement is 0.25. With a higher φ0, the leverage difference between state 0 and state
L is 24.79%, which is reduced from the difference (25.32%) in the benchmark case. However, increasing
h0 raise the difference to 26.60%. These results also reflect the discussion above.
3.3 Robustness analysis
In the previous section, three simulations fix the initial collateral requirement on capital goods at 1. In
order to verify if this specification is robust, I do the three simulations with φ0 = 0.8. The results are
shown in the Tables 12-19. Tables 12 and 13 show that capital prices are increasing and decreasing with
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leverage. Also, a higher investment at date 0 induces a lower capital prices at date 1. Tables 14 and
15 illustrate that the macro-prudential policy ∆φ0 > 0 leads the difference of capital prices between
state 0 and state L to decline, while ∆h0 > 0 leads the difference to increase. Also, the results related
to consumption differences and social welfare show that the decrease of the consumption volatility of
pessimists induces an increase of social welfare. Moreover, Tables 16 to 18 verify that the results in
tables 8-11 are robust. I also test the simulations with φ0 fixed at 0.85 and 0.9 and ρ. The results has
similar characteristics. I also test the simulations with different risk preferences, ρ = 0.8 and ρ = 2. In
short, the robustness analysis generates the same intuition as the above discussion.
4 Pecuniary externalities and macro-prudential perturbations
The previous section has shown how the macro-prudential tools affect the leverage cycle in the L-economy
and the CPI-economy. In this section, I present how the changes of capital prices induce the pecuniary
externalities which influence the effect of macro-prudential perturbations on social welfare.
4.1 Macro-prudential perturbations in the L-economy
The tightness of collateral constraint in the L-economy is captured by the Lagrangian multiplier of the
collateral constraint on capital which is represented by µ̄1. Moreover, the different beliefs result in an
inequality of the agents’ present values of future wealth. The present values γis = λis/λi0, s ∈ ST , where
λis, s ∈ S is the marginal utilities of consumption. Thus, with the assumption π1L < π2L < π3L, in the





In the L-economy, the perturbation dφ0 at the initial state, where dφ0 > 0 induce marginal changes at
date 0, (dci0, dk0, dθi0b),with
3∑
i=1
widθi0b = 0, and then adjustments of the subsequent equilibrium plans and











Assume C̄b = (φ̄0). The complete derivation is in Appendix C.I.



























i − γ̄L1)p̄L, (9)








and I refer to Pφ,bs and Pφ,ks as the pecuniary externalities induced by the changes of loan contract
price and capital prices at state s respectively,
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Table 12: Equilibrium Leverage Cycle when σ =
0.15
States s = 0 s = H s = L
mbs 0.7691 - 0.6183
Leverages 2.7851 - 1.8026
ps 1.5 3.3911 0.9721
ks 1.4064 0.6784 0.5457
c1s 1.2425 3.2108 0.7257
Table 13: Equilibrium Leverage Cycle when σ =
0.25
States s = 0 s = H s = L
mbs 0.7506 - 0.6477
Leverages 2.6705 - 1.9064
ps 1.5 3.2914 0.9535
ks 1.4734 0.7025 0.6859
c1s 1.1724 3.1956 0.6769
Table 14: Effects of two macro-prudential policies
when σ = 0.15
Benchmark ∆φ0 ∆h0
rbL 0.7777 1 1
(pL − α)/α -0.3519 -0.3457 -0.3546
(c1L− c10)/c10 -0.4159 -0.4016 -0.4165
(c2L− c20)/c20 -0.1417 -0.1752 -0.1676
(c3L− c30)/c30 -0.0944 -0.1037 -0.0591
V 1.6163 1.6147 1.6217
Table 15: Effects of two macro-prudential policies
when σ = 0.25
Benchmark ∆φ0 ∆h0
rbL 0.7628 1 1
(pL − α)/α -0.3643 -0.3599 -0.3691
(c1L− c10)/c10 -0.4226 -0.4057 -0.4236
(c2L− c20)/c20 -0.1245 -0.1665 -0.1587
(c3L− c30)/c30 -0.0527 -0.0515 -0.002
V 1.6594 1.6656 1.6685
Table 16: The effects of ∆φ0 on Equilibrium Lever-
age Cycle when σ = 0.15
States s = 0 s = H s = L
mbs 0.9490 - 0.6230
Leverages 2.6379 - 1.7997
ps 1.5 3.4309 0.9815
ks 1.3807 0.7230 0.5374
c1s 1.2149 3.4015 0.9815
Table 17: The effects of ∆h0 on Equilibrium Lever-
age Cycle when σ = 0.15
States s = 0 s = H s = L
mbs 0.9068 - 0.6182
Leverages 3.1152 - 1.8084
ps 1.5 3.3796 0.9681
ks 1.4139 0.6811 0.5511
c1s 1.2433 3.2091 0.7249
Table 18: The effects of ∆φ0 on Equilibrium Lever-
age Cycle when σ = 0.25
States s = 0 s = H s = L
mbs 0.9458 - 0.6519
Leverages 2.5341 - 1.9059
ps 1.5 3.3215 0.9601
ks 1.4528 0.7585 0.6797
c1s 1.1401 3.4110 0.6776
Table 19: The effects of ∆h0 on Equilibrium Lever-
age Cycle when σ = 0.25
States s = 0 s = H s = L
mbs 0.8990 - 0.6478
Leverages 3.0183 - 1.9199
ps 1.5 3.2718 0.9464
ks 1.4870 0.7073 0.6988








































The effect of a positive dφ0 on social welfare is determined by the sign of equation (8). Equations (9)
and (10) reflect the effect of the perturbation dφ0 > 0 on social welfare through loan contract trading at
date 0. In the equation (9), p̄Ldφ0 describes the increase of rbL induced by a higher collateral requirement.
γ̄L




3, the sign of equation (9) is positive. Equation (9) characterizes the heterogeneity effect
which increases social welfare.
In the equation (10), µ̄
1
λ̄0
1 means the substitution rate between the value of holding capital as collateral
and the marginal utility of consumption at the initial date. A higher collateral requirement induces the
needs for more collateral to satisfy borrowing needs, w1θ̄0b
1. As θ̄0b
1
< 0, the sign of equation (10) is
negative. It characterizes collateral effect which decreases social welfare.
The equation (11) captures the channel of loan contract trading at state L. ¯θLb
i
dmbL stands for the
effect of perturbation dφ0 > 0 on money lent or borrowed by trading loans. As γ̄L1 < γ̄L2 < γ̄L3, the
positive sign of the equation (11) requires dmbL < 0. This means that reducing the cost of issuing loan
contracts is a positive force of the perturbation, dφ0 > 0 on social welfare.
The equations (12) and (13) show how pecuniary externalities induced by capital price changes
dps, s ∈ S1 affect social welfare. k̄s
i
dps, s ∈ S1 describes how the capital trading at date 1 influences
social welfare. k̄0dpH is the changes of the return of capital investment. As γ̄H1 > γ̄H2 > γ̄H3, the
positive sign of the equation (12) requires dpH > 0. Moreover, in the equation (13), θ̄0b
i
φ̄0dpL, i = {2, 3}
characterizes the changes of rbL by the changes of capital price in state L. If the w2 ≤ w3 and dpL > 0,
the sign of equation (13) is positive. These two conditions reflect that there are positive pecuniary
externalities if increasing φ0 leads capital price in the states H and L to rise.9
Proposition 1. When there is default in the state L, the sign of the effect of the perturbation dφ0 > 0
on social welfare is determined by the sign and magnitude of the following effects and externalities:
i) Heterogeneity effect: the sign is positive and the magnitude is determined by the difference in the
present values, γ̄Li and the net trading positions of loan contracts, θ̄0b
i
, i = 2, 3 and the capital price, p̄L;
ii) Collateral effect: the sign is negative and the magnitude of collateral effects is determined by the





iii) Pecuniary externalities: The sign and magnitude of pecuniary externalities are determined by
the following variables: 1) The difference in the present value γ̄si, s ∈ S1; 2) The net trading positions
on capital kis, s ∈ S1 and loan contracts θi0b and θiLb; 3) The sensitivity of equilibrium prices to the




, dpsdφ0 , s ∈ S1.
Proposition 1 shows the information needed to determine whether increasing the collateral require-
ment on capital improves social welfare. When borrowers default in the state L, heterogeneity effects
arise. As the higher collateral requirement increases the loan return in the bust state, lenders’ utilities
9The proof is in Appendix C.
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go up while borrowers utilities go down. Since the present values of lenders are higher than borrowers’,
the increase of lenders’ utilities is more than the decrease of borrowers’ utilities. Also, the capital price
in the state L of the initial equilibrium and lenders’ net positions of loans affects the magnitude of
heterogeneity effects.
Collateral effects arise because the macro-prudential perturbation dφ0 > 0 directly influences the
borrowing capacity of borrowers at date 0. Thus, relaxing borrowers’ collateral constraints induce welfare
benefit because it improves the effective financial decisions of constrained agents. The equation (10) also
reflects that only agents 1 are affected by collateral externalities, while all of agents are affected by
heterogeneity effects.
Pecuniary externalities arise for two reasons: (i) agents hold heterogeneous beliefs; (ii) the perturba-
tion dφ0 > 0 impacts capital prices and the funding cost at date 1. If tightening collateral constraints
of capital increases capital prices, this perturbation increases present values of capital holders at date 1.
In the state H, agents 2 and 3 buy capital goods from agents 1. The revenue of selling capital increased
by the perturbation dφ0 > 0 improves the agents 1 utility. As agents 1 are optimists, they have higher
present value γ1H than agents 2 and 3. Thus, a higher capital price has a positive effect on social welfare.
In addition, in the state L, agents 1 should deliver collateral, namely capital goods to agents 2 and 3 as
the repayment of loans. The return of lenders increases if the capital price in the state L is raised by
the higher collateral requirement. Although the higher capital price reduces the utilities of agents 1 in
the state L, this negative force is less than the positive force induced by the increase of lenders’ utilities.
Moreover, if the higher collateral requirement increases the loan contract price in the state L, agents 1
promise less return for borrowing, resulting in a negative effect on social welfare. The lower funding cost
of constrained agents reduces lenders’ utilities, when the capital return is uncertain in the state L. Also,
the results in the table 4 and 6 show that increasing collateral requirement can induce both a higher pL
and mbL. It means that the funding should be costly in a more uncertain situation though the price of
collateral is higher.
The results in table 10 present that social welfare decreases with a higher φ0. With the fundamental
values in the table 3, when belief disagreement is 0.15 or 0.25, the heterogeneity effect, collateral effect
and the pecuniary externalities are shown in the following table. Compare the sizes of the following
effects or pecuniary externalities, tables 20 and 21 show that heterogeneity effects and collateral effects
are dominant.




























The decline can be explained by a small welfare improvement induced by the heterogeneous effect.
This is also reflected by a higher consumption differences between state 0 and state L of moderates and
pessimists. However, if there is a strong heterogeneous effect, the social welfare may be increased. For
example, Table 11 provides the evidence that when the consumption differences between state 0 and
state L of moderates decrease, social welfare is improved by a higher φ0.



















where I refer to Pφ,kn,L as the pecuniary externalities induced by capital price changes in the case where













The equation (14) shows that if the loan contracts sellers do not default in the state L. The pertur-
bation dφ0 > 0 does not induce heterogeneity effect. The reason is that when rbL = min{1, φ̄0p̄L} = 1, a
higher φ0 does not increases lenders’ utility or reduce borrowers’ utility in the state L. Moreover, the per-
turbation still induces collateral effect and pecuniary externalities, but pecuniary externalities induced
by capital price changes dpL are different. In the equation (15), k̄0dpL characterizes the changes of the
return of capital investment and k̄L
i
dpL describes the trading of capital goods. As γ̄L1 < γ̄L2 < γ̄L3,
the positive sign of the equation (15) is dpL < 0. This means that if agents 2 and 3 spend less in buying
capital goods from agents 1 in the state L, the perturbation dφ0 > 0 has a positive force on welfare
improvement by reducing pL.
Corollary 1. When there is no default in the state L, the sign of the effect of the perturbation dφ0 > 0
on social welfare is determined by the sign and magnitude of the following effects and externalities:
i) Collateral effect: the sign is negative and the magnitude of collateral effects is determined by the





ii) Pecuniary externalities: The sign and magnitude of pecuniary externalities are determined by
the following variables: 1) The difference in the present value γ̄si, s ∈ S1; 2) The net trading positions
on capital kis, s ∈ S1 and loan contracts θi0b and θiLb; 3) The sensitivity of equilibrium prices to the




, dpsdφ0 , s ∈ S1.
4.2 Macro-prudential perturbations in the CPI-economy
In the CPI-economy, the perturbation dh0 at the initial state, where dh0 > 0 induce marginal changes






widθi0j = 0 and then adjustments of the sub-




















L) and p̄L < 1/φ̄0, p̄H > 1/φ̄0. C̄
b
0 = (φ̄0, h̄0), where

















L + Υ0, (16)





3 − γ̄L2)rjL, (17)
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and I refer to Pφ,bs and Pφ,ks as the pecuniary externalities induced by the changes of loan contract














































The positive sign of equation (16) stands for a positive effect of the perturbation dh0 > 0 on welfare.
The equation (17) characterizes the channel of CPI contract trading via which the perturbation dh0 > 0
impacts social welfare. In the CPI-economy, the default of agents 1 lead agents 2 to lose and agents 3
is protected by CPI trading. The transfer of the present value loss from agents 3 to 2 is characterized
equation (17). Since γ̄L3 > γ̄L2, the sign of the equation (17) is positive.
The equations (18) and (19) captures pecuniary externalities induced by loan contract trading at
state L and capital trading at state H. The discussion is the same with the discussion of equations (11)
and (12). Additionally, the equation (20) has an additional term h̄0θ̄0b
3
(γ̄L
3 − γ̄L2))φ̄0dpL, compared
with the equation (13). It means that the transfer of present value loss from agents 3 to 2 is also influence
by dpL. If dpL > 0, the transfer is increased by a higher h0.
The equation (21) characterizes how the increase of financial innovation cost influences social welfare.
Since θ̄0b
1
< 0, the sign of the equation (21) is negative. Since increasing h0 requires more CPI contracts
for each loan, the higher financial innovation cost reduces social welfare.
Proposition 2. When there is default in the state L, the sign of the effect of the perturbation dh0 > 0
on social welfare is determined by the sign and magnitude of the following effects and externalities:
i) Heterogeneity effect: the sign is positive and the magnitude is determined by the difference in the
present values, γ̄Li and the net trading positions of loan contracts, θ̄0b
3 and the CPI return, rjL;
ii) Pecuniary externalities: The sign and magnitude of pecuniary externalities are determined by the
following variables: the difference in the present value γ̄si, s ∈ S1, and the net trading positions on capital
kis, s ∈ S1 and loan contracts θi0b and θiLb, and the sensitivity of equilibrium prices to the perturbation




, dpsdh0 , s ∈ S1,
iii)Financial innovation cost effect: the sign is negative and the magnitude is determined by the net
trading positions of loan contracts, θ̄0b
1.
Proposition 2 shows the information needed to determine whether increasing the collateral require-
ment on CPI contracts increases social welfare in the CPI-economy. The heterogeneous effect is a positive
force on welfare improvement. It arises because agents 2 and 3 hold heterogeneous beliefs. Trading in
the CPI market between agents 2 and 3, whereas eliminates heterogeneity effects caused by the belief
disagreement between agents 1 and the others. The size of the welfare improvement is determined by
two factors: i) the transfer of the present value loss from agents 3 to 2; ii) the return of CPI contracts in
the state L, rjL = 1− φ̄0p̄L.
24
The perturbation dh0 > 0 induces no collateral effect. Since dφ0 = 0, the tightness of collateral
constraint on capital remains the same, µ̄1 × dφ = 0 . Also, this CPI market clearing ensures that
increasing h will not induce the shortage of collateral. Hence, η̄1 does not affect social welfare.
Pecuniary externalities arise for two reasons: (i) agents hold heterogeneous beliefs; (ii) the perturba-
tion dh0 > 0 also influences capital prices and the funding cost at date 1. Since CPI contracts substitute
capital goods to serve as collateral, increasing h0 may lead capital prices to decrease, resulting in a de-
cline of social welfare. If agents share similar beliefs, negative pecuniary externalities are stronger than
heterogeneity effects. Introducing CPI contracts may reduce social welfare.
With the fundamental values in the table 3, when belief disagreement is 0.15 or 0.25, the heterogeneity
effect and the pecuniary externalities are shown in the following table. Comparing the sizes of the
following effects or pecuniary externalities, I find that tables 22 and 23 show that heterogeneity effects
are dominant, while pecuniary externalities are close to zero.









0.0006 0 0 0 0









0.0022 0 0 -0.0001 0
The financial innovation cost effect arises because CPI sellers need to collect information of medium
and small firms. As economies of scale cuts the financial innovation cost, the effect is trivial if the size
of financial intermediaries is big.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes how belief heterogeneity influences the leverage cycle and the effectiveness of macro-
prudential policies. The central feature of the model is that agents lend by buying risky collateralized
loans from borrowers who do not share the same beliefs. Lenders might lose if borrowers default. Macro-
prudential policies reduce lenders’ loss by requiring borrowers to hold more collateral. The interventions
affect loan trades and the volatility of leverage across the cycle. The simulation results show that a
decrease in capital price occurs with a decrease in leverage. Increasing the collateral requirement on
capital reduces the volatility of leverage. However, the lower volatility of leverage may not induce
welfare-improving. Additionally, belief heterogeneity influences the decline of capital prices from normal
times to crisis times. When belief heterogeneity is under the moderate level, capital prices in the crisis
times will not induce default. The policy takeaway is that policymakers need to identify and measure
belief heterogeneity to design macro-prudential policies.
Increasing the collateral requirement on capital induces three types of effects on social welfare. Het-
erogeneous effects increase social welfare when the macro-prudential perturbation benefits agents who
value their utilities in the bust state more. Collateral effects reduce social welfare when the higher
collateral requirement increases the funding cost of borrowers. Pecuniary externalities occur when the
heterogeneous agents value the asset returns differently. The sign of pecuniary externalities depends on
capital price changes. The sign of the effect of the perturbation on social welfare is determined by the
sign and magnitude of these effects and externalities. I propose an alternative macro-prudential policy
tool, namely collateral hedging, which can both reduce lenders’ loss and stimulate economic activities.
The simulation results show that introducing CPI contracts increases the volatility of leverage across
25
the cycle. Although pecuniary externalities reduce social welfare, this perturbation may increase social
welfare. The reason is that increasing collateral requirements on CPI contracts induce heterogeneity
effects and no collateral effects.
This paper also implies that financial intermediaries play an important role in implementing the
macro-prudential policies with financial innovation. Selling CPI contracts requires the ability to evalu-
ate risk and the certification of issuing insurance contracts. Even though governments have the same
advantages for providing CPI contracts, political and interest group resistance, and weakness in the gov-
ernance framework influence policy stances (Bengtsson, 2019; Claessens, 2015). CPI trading eliminates
the political economy constraints. The future work could focus on introducing financial innovation as an
alternative policy
Appendix
A. General equilibrium in the L-economy





























































































The first budget constraint requires that money spent on consumption goods beyond the revenue from
endowments and production in state 0 be financed out of the sale of contracts. The second and third
budget constraints require money spent on the consumption goods and capital goods beyond the revenue
from endowments and production in any state s ∈ S1 be financed out of net revenue from return from
26
contracts bought or sold in state 0. From the fourth The last constraint requires that agents actually
hold as least as much of capital as financial contracts require them to hold.
Suppose λ1sare the Lagrangian multipliers for the budget constraints, and µ10 and µ1L are the La-
grangian multipliers for the the collateral constraints on capital goods.
In the equilibrium, for each agents i, λ̄s
i
= ∂ui(c̄s
i)/∂cis, s ∈ S . Also, I assume the present value of
agents is γ̄s∗ i = λ̄s∗
i
/λ̄0




i and γ̄si will be used in the following appendix.
Assume that p̄L < 1/φ̄0, p̄H ≥ 1/φ̄0.






























































































































































































































































k3L : p̄L = ¯γLL
3rkLL + ¯γLH
3rkLH , (A.12)







































)) should satisfy budget con-
straints, four Euler equations, and market clearing conditions. If the results p̄s satisfy the assumption








)) is the solution of this
optimization problem in the default case.




















B. General equilibrium in the CPI-economy
















)) such that solves maximum problems as follow



































































































−θ10bh0 = θ10j ,
−θ1LbφL = kL.
The first seven constraints are budget constraints, and the last three constraints are collateral con-
straints.
Suppose η10 is the Lagrangian multiplier for the the collateral constraint on CPIs.
Assume that p̄L < 1/φ̄0, p̄H ≥ 1/φ̄0.



































































































































































k2L : p̄L = ¯γLL
2rkLL + ¯γLH
2rkLH , (B.10)

















































L + pLk0 + θ
3


















































k3L : p̄L = ¯γLL
3rkLL + ¯γLH
3rkLH , (B.14)



































The general equilibrium ((m̄b0, m̄bL,
¯











)) should satisfy budget
constraints, six Euler equations and market clearing conditions. If the results p̄s satisfy the assumption
that p̄L < 1/φ̄0, p̄H ≥ 1/φ̄0, the ((m̄b0, m̄bL,
¯











)) is the solution of
this optimization problem in the default case.
C. Proofs
I. Macro-prudential perturbations in the L-economy
In the L-economy, the perturbation dφ0 at the initial state, where dφ0 > 0 induce marginal changes at
date 0, (dci0, dk0, dθi0b),with
3∑
i=1
widθi0b = 0, and then adjustments of the subsequent equilibrium plans and











Then, I compute the marginal change of consumption distribution of each type of agents, relative
to the stationary competitive equilibrium, following a marginal change of the policy parameter dφ0.
Because of market clearing conditions, the effect on social welfare does not require compute dmb0. Then,
I compute the marginal changes of utilities of each type of agents and social welfare.













Case 1: If in the equilibrium, p̄L < 1/φ̄, p̄H ≥ 1/φ̄ , there is default in the state L.
Type 1
The change of type 1 consumption at date 0 is
dc10 |φ0=φ̄0= −θ̄0b
1
dmb0 − m̄b0dθ10b − adk0. (C.2)























































The change of type 1 consumption in the L state is




































Lb − p̄Ldk1L − k̄L
1
dpL. (C.4)



























dmbL − ¯γLH1dθ1Lb − ¯γLH1rkLHdk1L − k̄L
1
dpL (C.5)







0b + p̄Hdk0 + k̄0dpH . (C.6)






0b + ( ¯γHL
1rkHL + ¯γHH
1rkHH)(dk0 − dk1H) + k̄0dpH . (C.7)




















Lb + rLL(−φ̄Ldθ1Lb) = 0. (C.9)








Substitute equations (C.3), (C.5), (C.7), (C.8), (C.9), (C.10) and (C.11) into equation (C.1), and the
marginal change of agent 1’s utility is
du1
λ̄0




















The change of type 2 consumption at date 0 is
dc20 |φ0=φ̄0= −θ̄0b
2
dmb0 − m̄b0dθ20b. (C.13)
Then, substitute (A.6) into (C.13), I obtain
dc20 |φ0=φ̄0= −θ̄0b
2
dmb − (γ̄L2φ̄0p̄L + γ̄H2)dθ20b. (C.14)
The change of type 2 consumption in the L state is













Then, substitute (A.7) and (A.8) into (C.15), I obtain
dc2L |φ0=φ̄0=− ¯θLb
2


















Then, substitute (A.9) into (C.17), I obtain
































Substitute equations (C.14), (C.16), (C.18), (C.19), (C.20), (C.21) and (C.22) into equation (C.1),
and the marginal change of agent 2’s utility is
du2
λ̄0


















The change of type 3 consumption at date 0 is
dc30 |φ0=φ̄0= −θ̄0b
3
dmb0 − m̄b0dθ30b. (C.24)
Then, substitute (A.11) into (C.24), I obtain
dc30 |φ0=φ̄0= −θ̄0b
3
dmb − (γ̄L3φ̄0p̄L + γ̄H3)dθ20b. (C.25)
The change of type 3 consumption in the L state is













Then, substitute (A.12) and (A.13) into (C.26), I obtain
dc3L |φ0=φ̄0=− ¯θLb
3


















Then, substitute (A.14) into (C.28), I obtain
































Substitute equations (C.25), (C.27), (C.29), (C.30), (C.31), (C.32) and (C.33) into equation (C.1),
and the marginal change of agent 3’s utility is
du3
λ̄0


















































































































































































































1 − γ̄L2) ¯θLb
2
+ w3(γ̄L
1 − γ̄L3) ¯θLb
3
)dmbL



























































































































1 ≥ 0, the positive sign of the fourth line requires dpL > 0 and agents 1
hold capital goods in the state L in the equilibrium.
Case 2: If in the equilibrium, p̄L ≥ 1/φ̄, p̄H ≥ 1/φ̄ , there is no default in the state L.
Type 1


























































The change of type 1 consumption in the L state is








0b + p̄Ldk0 + k̄0dpL. (C.37)
Then, substitute (A.3), (A.4) into (C.37), which are from first order conditions for an optimum at









0b + p̄Ldk0 + k̄0dpL
=− ¯θLb
1
















0b + p̄Ldk0 + k̄0dpL
=− ¯θLb
1




0b + p̄Ldk0 + k̄0dpL (C.38)
dc1H |φ0=φ̄0 , dc
1
HH |φ0=φ̄0 , dc
1
HL |φ0=φ̄0 , dc
1
LH |φ0=φ̄0 and dc
1
LL |φ0=φ̄0 is not influenced by the default
in the state L.
Thus, substitute equations (C.36), (C.38), (C.7), (C.8), (C.9), (C.10) and (C.11) into equation (C.1),
and the marginal change of agent 1’s utility is
du1
λ̄0



















I substitute (A.15) into (C.13), the change of type 2 consumption at date 0 is
dc20 |φ0=φ̄0= −θ̄0b
2
dmb − (γ̄L2 + γ̄H2)dθ20b. (C.40)
The change of type 2 consumption in the L state is
38









Then, substitute (A.7) and (A.8) into (C.41), I obtain
dc2L |φ0=φ̄0=− ¯θLb
2






dc2H |φ0=φ̄0 , dc
2
HH |φ0=φ̄0 , dc
2
HL |φ0=φ̄0 , dc
2
LH |φ0=φ̄0 and dc
2
LL |φ0=φ̄0 is not influenced by the default
in the state L.
Thus, substitute equations (C.40), (C.42), (C.18), (C.19), (C.20), (C.21) and (C.22) into equation
(C.1), and the marginal change of agent 2’s utility is
du2
λ̄0













Substitute (A.16) into (C.24), I obtain, the change of type 3 consumption at date 0 is
dc30 |φ0=φ̄0= −θ̄0b
3
dmb − (γ̄L3 + γ̄H3)dθ20b. (C.44)
The change of type 3 consumption in the L state is









Then, substitute (A.12) and (A.13) into (C.45), I obtain
dc3L |φ0=φ̄0=− ¯θLb
3






dc3H |φ0=φ̄0 , dc
3
HH |φ0=φ̄0 , dc
3
HL |φ0=φ̄0 , dc
3
LH |φ0=φ̄0 and dc
3
LL |φ0=φ̄0 is not influenced by the default
in the state L.
Thus, substitute equations (C.44), (C.46), (C.29), (C.30), (C.31), (C.32) and (C.33) into equation
(C.1), and the marginal change of agent 3’s utility is
du3
λ̄0








































































Since γ̄L1 < γ̄L2 < γ̄L3, the positive sign of the third line requires dpL < 0.
II. Macro-prudential perturbations in the CPI-economy
In the CPI-economy, the perturbation dh0 at the initial state, where dh0 > 0 induce marginal changes at






widθi0j = 0 and then adjustments of the subsequent




















Then, I compute the marginal change of consumption distribution of each type of agents, relative
to the stationary competitive equilibrium, following a marginal change of the policy parameter dh0.
Because of market clearing conditions, the effect on social welfare does not require compute dmb0 and
dmj0. Then, I compute the marginal changes of utilities of each type of agents and social welfare.














The change of type 1 consumption at date 0 is
dc10 |h0=h̄0= −θ̄0b
1






0j − adk0. (C.50)
Then, substitute (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3) into (C.50), which are from first order conditions for an






























Since both collateral constraint bind, k0 = −φ0θ10b. θ10j = −h0θ10b. Hence, the marginal changes


























































Lb − p̄Ldk1L − k̄L
1






(1− h̄0)dpL + .
θ̄0b
1
(1− φ̄0p̄L)dh0 + p̄Ldk0 + k̄0dpL − φ̄0θ̄0j
1
dpL + (1− φ̄0p̄L)dθ10j (C.52)









Lb − p̄Ldk1L − k̄L
1
dpL (C.53)
Then, substitute (B.4), (B.5) into (C.53), which are from first order conditions for an optimum at


























dmbL − ¯γLH1dθ1Lb − ¯γLH1rkLHdk1L − k̄L
1
dpL (C.54)







0b + p̄Hdk0 + k̄0dpH . (C.55)






0b + ( ¯γHL
1rkHL + ¯γHH
1rkHH)(dk0 − dk1H) + k̄0dpH . (C.56)



















Lb + rLL(−φ̄Ldθ1Lb) = 0. (C.58)
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Substitute equations (C.53), (C.55), (C.56),(C.57),(C.58),(C.59) and (C.60) into equation (C.49), and
the marginal change of agent 1’s utility is
du1
λ̄0






















The change of type 2 consumption at date 0 is
dc20 |h0=h̄0= −θ̄0b
2









Then, substitute (B.7) and (B.8) into (C.62), I obtain
dc20 |h0=h̄0= −θ̄0b
2















Lb − p̄Ldk2L − k̄L
2
















Then, substitute (B.9) and (B.10) into (C.64), I obtain
dc2L |h0=h̄0=− ¯θLb
2





(1− h̄0)dpL + θ̄0b
2















Then, substitute (B.11) into (C.66), I obtain
































Substitute equations (C.63), (C.65), (C.67), (C.68), (C.69), (C.70) and (C.71) into equation (C.49),
and the marginal change of agent 2’s utility is
du2
λ̄0























The change of type 3 consumption at date 0 is
dc30 |h0=h̄0= −θ̄0b
3
dmb0 − m̄b0dθ30b. (C.73)
Then, substitute (B.12) into (C.60), I obtain
dc30 |h0=h̄0= −θ̄0b
3
dmb − (γ̄L3(φ̄0p̄L + h̄0rjL) + γ̄H
3)dθ20b. (C.74)





Lb − p̄Ldk3L − k̄L
3







(1− h̄0)dpL + θ̄0b
3
(1− φ̄0p̄L)dh0 (C.75)
Then, substitute (B.13) and (B.14) into (C.62), I obtain
dc3L |h0=h̄0=− ¯θLb
3
dmbL − ( ¯γLL3φ̄LrkLL + ¯γLH3)dθ2Lb − ( ¯γLL3rkLL + ¯γLH3rkLH)dk3L − k̄L
3
dpL






(1− h̄0)dpL + θ̄0b
3
(1− φ̄0p̄L)dh0 (C.76)








Then, substitute (A.15) into (C.64), I obtain
































Substitute equations (C.61), (C.63), (C.65), (C.66), (C.67), (C.68) and (C.69) into equation (C.36),
and the marginal change of agent 3’s utility is
du3
λ̄0






























































































































































































































1, the first line of equation (C.84) is positive. The positive signs
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